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The agreement reached in Dayton in November 1995
and its basic outline were already assured by the successes
of the Croatian and Bosnian militaries in August, 1995.
The successful implementation of the NATO/military
aspect of the Dayton Agreement during the first three
months were already assured by the NATO air campaign
against the Serbian forces in September, 1995.
Unfortunately, while these successes did bring about an
end to the war, they did not provide for the transition to,
and durability, of the peace.
. Much has been said lately about the successful
implementation of the military aspect of the Dayton
Agreement. With 60,000 troops on the ground, thousands
of tanks and APC's, hundreds of aircraft to maintain the
unchallenged control of the skies and, most critically, the
fresh evidence of NATO's new willingness in the fall of
1995 to use that overwhelming force, should there ever
have been any doubt as to success.
Much also has been said about the relatively slow
progress of the so defined "civilian" aspect of the
implementation. This slowness can be explained by several
factors, the most critical of which are: First, many elements
defined as part of the civilian implementation task more
properly belong, in larger part, within the military task. In
attempting to avoid "mission creep" at all costs,
responsibilities are piled onto an improperly equipped and
mandated civilian mission. As an example, this includes
apprehension of war criminal suspects or providing
security for freedom of movement or elections.
Second, already overburdened, the civilian
implementation has been provided with inadequate
resources. In addition, the financial pledges made for
reconstruction are inadequate, and, even then, slowly, or
not at all realized.
Third, the civilian implementation task is not only ill
defined but there is almost a total lack of agreement as to
what it is intended to ultimately achieve. This last factor
is the most difficult to overcome. The organizations
involved as well as the parties to the Agreement are too
frequently working at cross-purposes. The Dayton
Agreement has not only failed to produce a common vision
but it has promulgated the survival of the ideology that is
committed to the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and a tolerant, democratic and multi-cultural society.
Consequently, although Dayton is an attempt at peace
through compromise, there is no reconciliation between
the two ideologies at war. Instead, the institutions
envisioned in the Dayton Agreement to cement peace are
being stretched beyond any reasonable capacity to
compensate for the perpetuation of the two irreconcilable
ideologies that still persist in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If this was an issue of Bosniaks versus Croats, the
process of reconciliation would be difficult but at least
conceptually manageable. Unfortunately though, this is a
matter of an ideology of pluralism, democracy and
openness confronted by an ideology committed to a
homogeneous, closed, undemocratic and intolerant
society. These two ideologies cannot flourish nor even
survive side by side within one society or even one
governmental structure. By definition, a closed and
intolerant philosophy is committed to destroying an open,
pluralistic and democratic system. The Dayton Agreement
has not in essence addressed this most basic inconsistency.
It pays lip service to tolerance, democracy and pluralism,
but, in fact, because of a fear to confront that still exists in
Western capitals, the ideological challenge of ethnic purity
and authoritarianism has not been answered. These
Western capital may attempt to blame all Bosnians for
this continuing failure, but it is their avoidance and design
in Dayton that failed to confront this basic problem.
Unfortunately, the Bosnians are then left with the ongoing
structural problem of the Dayton Agreement and the
blame for the symptoms of this problem that are evident
to all. The Dayton Agreement and real peace will only
prevail when the ideology of openness, democracy and
pluralism is adequately supported over, and not equated
to, the ideology of intolerance, authoritarianism and a
closed system.
This same, general prognosis also applies to the
region. While Dayton should have provided a new impetus
for positive change within many states of the region, it
seems to have been used as a mechanism to avoid progress
and to revert to failed philosophies of the past. This
unfortunate consequence is evident in more than one state,
but it is nowhere more clear than in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). President
Milosevic has exploited the international community's
approach to him, as a key to peace, to legitimize his rule.
He has refashioned his government, even more since
Dayton, to extinguish any flicker of opposition and an
independent media and to bring back to life the most
controlling aspects of Stalinist communism.
The final grade with the respect to the Dayton
Agreement still is far off. Certainly, the results can be
enhanced over the next few months. However, while the
military aspect of implementation is a relative success,
those elements necessary for durable peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the region remain unresolved. Dayton
has been approached by most Western capitals with the
view to stop the war at the least cost with the least risk of
conflict. So far they have received what they paid for - a
rickety peace. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the region, in general, are still in need of something more
credible. To alter this situation, there will have to be a
greater and, most critically, sincere contribution from the
outside and a firm commitment from our leadership and
people in the region not to allow false ideologies and
leaders to set, the agenda. We must demand true
democracy, openness, tolerance and economic
accountability from the international and regional
leadership if the true spirit of peace, compromise and
Dayton are to prevail. •
